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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SEARLE BROTHERS, a partnership,
DIAMOND HILLS MOTEL, a partnersh~,
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT A. SEARLE
and RANDY B. SEARLE,

itoiJ

Plaintiffs and
Appellants 1

vs.

=-~·

EDLEAN SEARLE,
Defendant and
Respondent.

APPEAL FROM FINAL
DISTRICT COURT OP THI
AND FOR UINTAH couN'tf
PLAINTIFFS' AMBNDBD
PREJUDICB, HONORABQJ

u ·. . . . . . .

RAY E. NASH
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
33 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
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Oi' TllL SL\ll 01' LJ'l1\ll

SLi\RLL l\IWTI!l'i\S, a nartncrship
lllJ\f\lONJJ !!ILLS ~.j()'[LL', a partncr~hip,
R:\NC[ \\I. SEARLE, Rl!ETT /\. SF/\RU:
and RANDY B. SEARLE,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No.

15604

vs.
I:DLEAN SEARLE,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF OF PL/\INTHFS AND /\PPILLANTS

*********************
APPIAL FROJll FINAL ORDERS OF Tl!r FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT OF TllE STATE OF UT/\!! IN
AND FOR UINTA!! COUNTY, DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' MIENDED CQillPLAINT \VITI!
PREJUDICE, HONORABLE D/\VTJ: SM!, JUDGE

*********************
CULLLN Y. CIIRISTENSEN, for
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR I:; ~!OODY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
SS East Center Street
Provo, Utah
84601
RAY E. NASH
Attorney for Defendant
and Respondent
33 East f\!ain Street
Vernal, Utah
84078
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SEARLE BROTHERS, et al.,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 1560'f
ADDITIONAL CITATION OF
AUTHORITY

EDLEAN SEARLE,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Additional citation of authority submitted on behalf
of plaintiffs and appellants to be inserted at page 11 of
appellants' initial Brief irrnnediately prior to "Conclusion" and
addressed to the point that plaintiffs' and appellants' claims
herein are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as
alleged by the defendant.
The plaintiffs herein, not having been made parties
to the divorce action between defendant herein, EDLEAN SEARLE,
and WOODEY B. SEARLE, cannot be bound by the judgment of the
Court in that proceeding.

As stated by this Supreme Court in

the case of Ruffinengo vs. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, decided
May 5, 1978:
"Collateral estoppel is not a defense as against
a litigant who was not a party to the action and
judgment claimed to have created an estoppel".

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respectfully submitted,
~
/

.

. Cullen
. ,/ tt'f·' .l

Christensen, or
TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
SS East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
CHRIST~lSEH,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Ray E. Nash, attorney for defendant and respondent,
33 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84.078, this :2$~ day of

./£-k_:tc;;,,.t-c-i,/ .
?'

19 7 8.
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IN TIIE SUl'RLMF COURT OF TllE STJ\1T OF UTJ\II
--------

SL!\RLE BROTHERS, a partnership,
DIAMOND HILLS ~IOTEL, a partnership,
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT J\. SEARLE
and RANDY R. SEARLE,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

Case No. 15604

vs.
EDLEAN SEARLE,
Defendant and
Respondent.

BRIEF ON APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

***********
STATE/l!ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This case involves an appeal from final orders of
the lower Court, Honorable David Sam, Judge, dismissing
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice and holding that
a prior judgment of the same Court, Honorable George E. Ballif,
Judge, Case No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle), is res judicata as
to the claims of these plaintiffs and appellants as to an
interest in real property, these plaintiffs and appellants not
having been parties to said Case No. 5790.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was submitted to the Court on stipulated
facts and memoranda of authority.

From an order dismissing
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the plaintiffs' /\menclccl Complaint w.ith prejudice, plai11tilfc;
appeal.
RLU L F SOI JC;l!l O'i /\!' l'F'\ L

Plaintiffs ancl c1ppellants seek reversal

o[

the Lo1ver

Court's orders dismissing plaintilfs' /\me11clecl Complaint \vith
prejudice, wherein plaintiffs sought a determination of their
ownersl1ip in real property and a partition of that interest.
ST/\THIENT

OF F/\CTS

This matter was submitted to the Court below on
stipulated facts for a determination as to whether or not the
Judgment of the Court in a prior case, to which plaintiffs were
not parties, is res judicata as to the claims of plaintiffs in
the matter now before the Court.
1977, R-67)

(Minute Entry elated l·lay 31,

These agreed facts as shown by the pleadings an<l

memoranda of counsel demonstrate that plaintiff SE/\RLE BROTHERS
is a partnership consisting of plaintiffs
RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE.

R/\NCE

W. SEARLE,

Searle Brothers Partner-

ship, is in turn a 50% owner of another partnership, Diamond
Hills

~lotel.

The other 50% interest of the D.iamoncl llills

Partnership is owned by WOODEY B. SEARLE.
R-114).

~lotel

(TR 134, Case 5790;

WOODEY B. SEARLE is the father of the individual

plaintiffs, RANCE IV. SJ:/\RLL, RllETT A. SEARLE anLl RANDY B. S[ARLl.
and the defendant EDLEJ\N SFARLE is the mother of such plaintiff'
(R-35, 68).

ll'OODEY R. SE1WLE and defendant

FDLJ:1\N

SEARLE,

previously husband and ,,·ire, were divorced by llcL·rce or the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Uintah Counly District Court cl<ited

~lay

17, 1973.

(R-105-113)

On January 16, 1967, the real property in question
hereinafter referred to as the "Slaugh !louse" ivas purchased
and paid for by check 1101884, drawn on the account of the
partnership, D[fu\IOND llILLS

~IOTEL,

but the deed to the property

1vas ina<lverten tly prepared sho\\·ing 1\TOODEY B. SEARLE as the
grantee.

(Def's. Ex. 1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 249,

260, Case No. 5790; R-115, 116).
The books and records of DIAMOND flILLS MOTEL partnership have, since 1967, shown the "Slaugh House" to be an asset
of that partnership and all rentals therefrom up to the time
of the divorce decree between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE
ivcre divided equally between WOODEY B. SEARLE and the plaintiff,
SEARLE BROTHERS partnership.

(Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790;

R-118).
During or about the year 1972, EDLEAN SEARLE commenced
an action for divorce against WOODEY B. SEARLE in the District
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, Case Ko. 5790, the
Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge.

EDLEAN SEARLE,

in the divorce action, claimed that the "Slaugh House" was an
asset of the marriage between her and WOODEY B. SEARLE, which
position was disputed by WOODEY B. SEARLE, who claimed the
"Slaugh !louse" to be the property of the

DIA~IOND

HILLS MOTEL

partnership and thereby 50% thereof was actually owned by
SF/\RLE BIWTfJERS partnership, the plaintiff in this action.
(llcf's. T:x. #12, Case No. 5790; R-118).

The Court, in the
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cl j v o r cc a c t ion , ch o :' c to :1 <lop t

th c l' o s i t i on o C J: ll LI:./\ N S Li\ IZ LT.

an<l ;11,arL\cd her thl, "Slaugh llritl:'r" as p:11·t uC Jirr dic;tril>uti\'l'
share of the mcnriar:c assets .in the IJccrce ol llivorcc.
(Paragraph 2 (d) llcc rec of ll i \ orcc, Case i\o.

S 790; lZ-10/).

Neither party to the d ivorcc action, nor the Court,
move<l or or<lered that the SE/\IZLL BROfllEIZS partnership or the
other plaintiffs herein be nwcle parties to the divorce action
although the plainti[fs and appellants in this action i.ere
within the jurisdiction of the Court and service of process
could have been obtained for that purpose.
action, !HIETT A.

SE/\l~LL

Plaintiffs in this

an<l RANDY B. SLl\RLE, did testify jn

the <livorce action concerning their interest in the DI/\(.JOND !Ill!:
~IOTEL

partnl.'rship, but neither ivas interrogated specifically

about the "Slaugh Ilouse".

(TR, Case No.

5790, 196-204, 261-2631

Based on this record and indicated facts,
below ruled that the plaintiffs'

the Court

intere:;t in the "Slaugh !louse"

was foreclosed by the Decree of Divorce in Case No.

5700; that

said Decree \\'as res ju,licata as to these plaintiff:;; crnd that
in any event the claims of the plaintiffs to the "Slaugh !louse"
were barred on the grounds of collateral estoppeJ.

The Court

below thereupon dismissed the /\men<lecl Complaint of the plaintifi'

'"it h pre j u dice .

( R - 8 0 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 5 - 8 6) .

It is from these orders that plaintiffs appeal.
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ARCU~IE~T

P01NT l
TllE LOWER COURT ERRID JN RULING TJJ,\T TllESE PLAINT IHS
J\Nll APPELLANTS WERE BOUND BY TllE DECJZEE OF DIVORCE IN CASE NO.
5790 (SEARLE VS. SEARLE), UINTAll COUNTY llTSTRIC:T COURT, THESE
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS NOT BEING PARTIES TO SAID CASE NO.
5790.
The orders of the Court below, being summary in nature
and based upon stipulated facts, these facts as alleged in
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and as hereinabove set forth,
must be considered as established for the the purposes of this
appeal.

(Frederick May

P. 2d 266)

& Company

vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368

Thus the questions on appeal are reduced to a

determination of whether, as a matter of law, such facts compel
a finding of res judicata and estoppel against these plaintiffs
and appellants.

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they do not.

This Supreme Court in the case of Tanner vs. Bacon,
103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held:
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment.
It only affects the parties and their successors in
interest and those who are in privity with a party
thereto. The word "privity" refers to a mutual or
successive relationship to the same right or property.
As applied to judgments or decrees of court, the
word means one whose interest has been legally
represented at the time."
The foregoing principle of law has likewise been
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Colemen vs.
f\utkovich vs. Summit County, 556 P. 2d 503; Bank of Vernal vs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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~in tah

Co _un t y

~__ll_2 __ll_!_a]:i '1}iG_7._'i()__l'_.~2_d_~8_l_;_Hc_C~ai:_!)'_ v_s_:_l'_~:i_.:k_'.-;

~~~'~ _i'._ 1!? v e _J__ri_s_~a_!_l_C: ~ -~o_mp_a~t- i_c~~, __S_~:1 __I' : __ 2_c~_J_l

7:_2_; __BL' Tl__ll_i_o n

J ns u ran cc c:_o~~y vs _. ______l__:c<-0_ '£C:~_rp_O:!:_i_1:!_L ~1 ri_,__s _ZL -~--2-~ ___!__0__:_)__<!

;

a ncl

F cder al Land_j0__ri_](_Q_l____ll_c r ~e J CL_V s .__l_'a c _('~ _ _§_7 _l_f_!_ah_l_:S_()_, __~_8__~_ 2d
480.

The principle is also djscussc:d in 46 /\m. Jur. 2d,

paragraphs 518-532.
Some examples of privity are:

Executor ivith testator;

heir with ancestor; assignee with assignor (but not assignor
with assignee); donee with donor; and lessee with lessor.
Privity means "derivative interest".
Midwest Oil Companyt C.C.A. Wyoming, 17 Federal 2d 71).

The

term "privity" denotes a mutual and successive relationship to
(Taylor vs. Barker, 70 Utah 534,

the same rights or property.

Plaintiffs take the position that at the time of
the hearing of the divorce case before Judge Ballif, there was
no privity between these plaintiffs in this case and WOODEY B.
SEARLE.

Their interests in the property in question

mutual and were not the same.

~ere

not

Plaintiffs do not claim any part

of the interest of WOODEY R. SEARLE, but assert their own
independent and separate partnershjp interest to SO'a of the
property involved, the "Slaugh House".
It appears clear that partnership interests are not
privy to each other.

Such interests are separate and distinct,

rather than successive and mutual, and, consequently, plaintiffs'
interests in the property in this case are not privy to the
interests of WOODLY ll. SE1\RLE.
209, 209 P.

(llillard vs. P.lcl\ni.glit,

2d 387).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~4

Cal.

To further clcmonstrate the point, partners are
characterized as co-owners o( specific partnership property
under ~~~o_n 4 8_::_l_::__?lJ_lL___Q_t:_c'.!_i_f_c:_c~(2~_no t ~_c:§__l~~ts amend eel.
Such an interest is the exact opposite of successive or privy
interests.

In fact one partner may even have a lien on the

partnership interest of another partner.

(illartin vs. Carlisle,

46 Oklahoma 268, 148 P. 833, 6 A.L.R. 154).
The property in question, the "Slaugh House", having
been purchased with partnership money, it was a partnership asset
irrespective of the fact that title was taken in the name of one
of the partners, WOODEY B. SEARLE,
Zd~),

(Fullmer vs. Blood, 546 P.

an<l \VOODF.Y B. SEARLE, as a partner, had no right to

enlarge his interest in partnership assets by any statement
which may have been attributed to him in the divorce action,
nor did the Court in that divorce action have any power or
authority to litigate and rule upon the interests of these
plaintiffs in the property in question without these plaintiffs
having been made a party to the divorce action.
The defendant argued in her memorandum to the trial
court that since WOODEY B. SEARLE was a partner of these
plaintiffs, he was also their agent for the purposes of receiving
notice and taking action with respect to matters involving the
specific partnership interests of these plaintiffs.

While a

partner is the agent of the partnership for purposes of partnership business while acting within the scope of his authority,
_(:c;_.ection 48-1-6 to 48-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended),

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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such agency docs not ext c n, l h c yon cl pa r t n c r :; h i p :1 I L1
fact that

;.i

portnl't, L'Cl()llLY B.

SJ.\l~LL,

11·;1:,

j 1

sued for

clicl not l<1ake him on :igcnt of the other partners h'.i.th

s.

I hc

cli\·oru~

rc'S!'l'Ct

to partnership property, nor in any h:1y make the partnership
or the other partners privy to the Llivorce action or 1n any h':1y
hound by the divorce decree.
\\! i th res pee t

(!JJ_ll_J.rcl vs_:__l~~~~1~g_l~_ ,;__l:lpra.)

to the contention argueLl hy clef enclan t

in

her memorandum to the Court belo1v, \vhich position 1vas adopted
by that Court, to the effect that plaintiffs herein shoulcl llOh
be cstoppecl from making a claim against the property in questio11
b cc au s e they cl i cl not ass c rt that c 1:1 i m i n the d iv or c e a c t i o 11 ,
it is true that nlai11tiffs did ha\·e kn01'1eclge or the divorce
proceeding, but the Lnv appears to he cl car to the c IFect that
actual knowledge of a proceeding 1vhich might affect one's interest in property does not necessarily cause one to be bound by
a j u<lgmen t
~~1pra),

in that proceeding (BaT1_l~_ol_V e rn ~'...:L~s. lJ int a~_~_l:l.ll~}_',

nor does the fact that one m:i.y have the right to inter-

vene in such an action, hind one 1mcler a juclgment in that actior

1

if in fact one does not intervene (46 /\m~--·_3~1!.__p'1!:.'..1)>,r~r_!_i_S;in 1
The Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah County c:i.se cited abore
appears particularly in point, since in that case it 1vc1s held
that a \dtness 1vho testified in the prior acti.on, but 1;as not
effectively made a party thereto, 1;as not bound by a juLlgmc11t
th er c in.

(See a 1 so ~o 1 C!ll_'.l_n__~~:-~'! ko\' i ch vs.

Sum1!.1._i_t: _C:Sl_l_JJ_t_tX,

supra, and ~lei-a rt y ~,;_.___l':i_El~ s_~_:'_. __Ho y .'._t.l__Q_l c_i3:i£__1_l!_s L_l~ncc Cr1rn1~"n i 1
supra.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The concept ol estoppel i111plies that someone has at
one time ta1'en a position or !ailed to take a position so as to
cause

;111

innocent party to act

in reli;i.nce thereupon and to

there;iftcr seek to take a different position to the detriment
of the innocent party.
case of

~lo

As stated by this Supre111e Court in the

rgan vs. Bo:ird of St;i.tc Lands

5·19 P. 2d 695, to-wit:

"Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault,
heen deluded into a course of action by the
wrong or neglect of another.
Estoppel arises
when a party by his acts, representations, or
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to
speak, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and that such other acting with
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the
former is permitted to deny the existence of such
facts."
Plaintiffs' actions or inaction with respect to the
divorce case between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE did
not mislead anyone so as to require imposition of the doctrine
0

r estoppel.

There is competent evidence in the record which

shows that the Court in the divorce case was apprised of information 1Vhich showed that the "Slaugh House" was really a partnership
;i.sset in 1Vhich these plaintiffs \Vere interested.

(Def's. Ex.

1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 259, 260, Case No. 5790;
R-115, 116).

The fact that the Court in the divorce action

apparently chose not to helieve such evidence, does not show
any inconsistent position on the part of these plaintiffs or
indicate in any1vay that these plaintiffs ll'ere trying to mislead
either the> Court of the defendant herein, EDLU\.\I SEARLE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I\ t t c ll t i () n

0

f t h c: cull t t

i ;; d i r l' c t l' d

t

(l

t h e c a ;; c

CJ

r

The facts of t!Ett case shOh' n sil1t;1tion ,,:herein the doctrine
of cstoppel

shoul<l proper!)" ;1pp I\'.

/\recitation or the

facts

nr

that case will <lemunstratc the diffc:rence fnrn1 the ca:oc JIO\v undt
consideration:
"In suit No. 2888 Civil, defenclJ.nt as oivner of
the 11' right IV at c rs sought ;t n a <l j u di cat ion as a g a inst
all claimants on the River of the amount o[ said
Wright Waters as 1vell as its priority.
llefenclant
employe<l Tanner ;1s cin adviser and consultant all during the litigation.
One of Tanner's duties 1"as to
advise and aid defendant i.n joining in said suit all
parties 1-:hich hacl, or might have, cl;iirns to 1vater
which might he affected by a decree in said suit.
Defend;int \\'as seeking to set at rest every claim 1d1ich
in any111ay might inpinge on its rights as finally
settled in the decree.
Knowing this, plajnti[[ fallcJ
to notify dcfend~rnt of his claim unLler /\ppljcation
!\:rnu-A hhich hcctmc CertiFicate 13l0.
Therefore,
1d1 i l e p l :i in t i f r ' s r i g h t s u n,l e r i\ pp 1 i cat i o n 4 :rn 6 - I\
(Certificate 1310) ivere not considered jn No. 2888
Civil, it Kas plaintiff himself 1\'110 1vas at fault in
not asserting them.
As adv is er to defcnclant he h'O.S
hound to direct attention to all claims challenging
either priority or amount of defendant's claims ivhich
might directly or jndirectly injure or affect its
rights.
This he failed to do and thus estopped
himself to assert his claims later."
The record in this c;ise clearly shows that these
plaintiffs did not do anything to mislead FDLU\N SE/\RL[ or the
Court in Case No.

5790 so as to support a claim for estoppel.

The position of the plajntiffs in Case No.
but was ignored.

5790 111as

indicated,

The doctrine of equitable estoppel cloes not

operate Jn favor of one ''iho has kno1vleclge of the essential Cad'
or who has convenient and av:lilahle me;i.ns of obtaining such
knowledge.
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ilcfendant, herself, or the Court for that
111atter could have made plaintiffs herein parties to the divorce
action in vie1-: of dc[end::mt's J:xhibit 1112 in that case (R-118);
ho11·evcr, since that 1,·as not done, these plaintiffs are not bound
by that d cc re e in Ca s c No . S 7 9 0 ( RLI l e 19 [ b ] , Utah I~ LI le s o f Ci vi 1

CONCLUSION
If allowed to stand, plaintiffs' ownership interest
in the property in question, the "Slaugh House", will have been
terminated by a Decree of Divorce to which plaintiffs were not
parties and under circumstances that do not justify such a
result on a theory of estoppel.
The orders of the Court below dismissing plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint with prejudice should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

;;;::/

~

/!:{:

.._/'

~·

i(J;;;L{ &!,7_~.t.
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C"ullen Y.'
ristensen, for
CHRISTEN· ,1 , TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
SS East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
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